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China has emerged as one of the top recipients of foreign 
direct investment in the world. Meanwhile, the successful 
transition experience of many Central and Eastern 
European countries has also allowed them to attract an 
increasing share of global foreign direct investment. In 
this paper, the authors use a panel data set to investigate 
whether foreign direct investment flows to these two 
regions are complements, substitutes, or independent of 
each other. Taking into account the role of host country 
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understand foreign direct investment inflows in transition economies. Policy Research Working Papers are also posted on 
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characteristics – such as market size, degree of trade 
liberalization, and human capital – the authors find no 
evidence that foreign direct investment flows to one 
region are at the expense of those to the other. Instead, 
the results suggest that foreign direct investment flows 
are driven by distinct regional production networks 
(and thus are largely independent of each other) and the 
development of global supply chains (indicating that 
foreign direct investment flows are complementary). 
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The past two decades have seen significant expansion in foreign direct investment 
(FDI) in China. Starting from a modest base of US$3.49 billion in 1990, China’s FDI 
inflows expanded rapidly to peak at over $44.2 billion in 1998. A further surge in FDI 
accompanied China’s accession to the World Trade Organization (WTO) in December 
2001, promoting China to a top position as an FDI destination in 2003.  In 2005, FDI 
inflows reached a record high of over $70 billion. 
Governments from other emerging markets are very concerned about this 
unprecedented growth. As they would point out, world FDI in the same period grows 
only at a moderate rate and this could imply that a rapid growth in FDI attraction like the 
one in China will eventually hollow out FDI shares to other emerging markets, which is 
often referred to in the literature as the China effect. Researchers as well as policymakers 
from many countries at various occasions expressed their concern over this issue
1 and it 
is clear that an empirical analysis with some convincing results is both urgent and 
necessary. 
So far, the existing literature is mainly focused on studying China and other Asian 
and Latin American countries while less attention has been paid to regions such as the 
Central and Eastern Europe. From history, the European Union (EU) has always been the 
largest source of FDI inflows to the Central and Eastern European countries (CEECs). 
When most CEECs opened their door to western direct investment after the transition in 
the early 1990’s, the more advanced economies in the region (the Czech Republic, 
Hungary, and Poland) were well-positioned to attract large flows of FDI. Their main 
                                                 
1 Chantasasawat et al. (2004) and Eichengreen and Tong (2005) cite several comments by politicians and scholars from 
emerging markets on the threat to FDI inflows posed by China. 
  2advantages in this regard include close geographical and cultural ties with traditional EU 
members as well as their initially low wage levels. Meanwhile, as remarkable economic 
achievement in East and Southeast Asia in the 1980s and 1990s caught the attention of 
the rest of the world (including the EU), an increasing share of world FDI started to flow 
into the region beginning 1996. China, as the region’s major successful performer in 
economic growth, becomes one of the most important host markets for European Union 
FDI. The dramatic increase of FDI in both regions arouses much concern over whether 
there exists an overall substitution or complementary effect on FDI attraction between the 
two regions. In particular, one may wonder if China’s emergence as a top FDI recipient 
tends to crowd out FDI inflows to CEECs. Since both China and CEECs have benefited a 
great deal from FDI inflows over the last two decades, such issue is of apparent interest 
to academic scholars and policymakers from both regions. 
We take the starting point of our study from one major insight from the existing 
literature of FDI in alternative emerging market economies, viz. such FDI is often 
motivated by investment to facilitate production networks.  We conceptualize our 
approach by considering three alternative scenarios that may exist between FDI in China 
and in CEECs.  The first possibility is that China itself is only in the Asian regional 
production network, with FDI go there being unrelated to FDI in CEECs.  A second 
possibility is that China and CEEC economies are together in a global production 
network, so that FDI to China and FDI to CEECs are complements.  Lastly, we can think 
of multinationals considering China and CEECs as rival production sites, implying that 
FDI flowing to China and to CEECs are substitutes. 
  3 The aim of this paper is to investigate our proxy for the impact of China together 
with other FDI locational determinants within an analytical framework. With a panel data 
of 15 CEECs spanning the period from 1990 to 2004, this empirical study tries to shed 
some light on the relationship between the two regions in terms of FDI attraction and 
further economic cooperation in a broader scope. The paper is organized as follows. 
Section 2 introduces a background review on FDI development in the two regions. 
Section 3 describes our data and estimation methodology. Section 4 presents the 
estimation results. Some robustness checks are discussed in section 5. Section 6 
concludes. 
 
2. FDI in China and Central and Eastern Europe since 1990 
China has, after its first adoption of open the door policy in 1978, experienced 
several phases in inward FDI absorption from the rest of the world (Figure 1). In the first 
stage, from 1979 to mid 1980’s, only a small amount of FDI flowed to the country 
annually due to its insufficient infrastructure and nontransparent regulations. 
Subsequently, FDI inflows to the country rose at a fairly steady pace until it made a 
slump in 1990 as a result of economic sanctions for political reasons. It was not until 
1992, the year in which the then Chinese leader Deng Xiaoping toured Shanghai and 
Guangdong with further commitment to open the market that the value of annual FDI 
inflows jumped up again to a new high of $11.2 billion. This wave of rapid surge 
continued through the following years until it slowed again as a result of the Asian 
financial crisis in 1997. China regained its attraction for FDI since 2000. Its accession to 
the WTO in 2001 induced a new surge of FDI inflows to the country. Despite a 
  4worldwide decline in FDI outflows, China continued its expansion in terms of its global 
FDI shares and overtook the United States to become the world’s second largest 
destination of FDI in the early 2000’s. Among the economies investing in China, a 
majority comes from industrialized or newly industrialized countries. Until the mid-
1990’s, Hong Kong was the largest source, accounting for more than 50 percent of the 
nation’s total FDI, followed by Taiwan, the U.S., Japan, Singapore, the U.K., South 
Korea, Canada and Germany. In recent years, there is decline in shares of FDI coming 
from Hong Kong and a rise in shares from other regions, contributing to a more 
diversified pool of FDI in China. Meanwhile, accompanying the double digit growth of 
the nation’s inward FDI are some prominent changes in its mode. In early period, FDI 
was allowed only in a small number of industries largely due to the government’s 
cautiousness against a dominance of foreign capital in many industries. Later on, 
especially after Deng’s southern tour in 1992, many more industries became open to 
foreign investors. With more foreign capital entering the industries such as 
manufacturing, retailing, real estate, transportation, and banking, FDI in China started to 
shift from labor- and capital-intensive to mainly technology based manufacturing with an 
increasing share towards service sectors (Figure 2). 
Similarly, FDI inflows to the Central and Eastern European Countries (CEECs) 
show a steady growth pattern over the last two decades. Beginning in 1989, all CEECs 
started the transition from former communist’s central planning economy to a free market 
economy. In the area of the former Soviet Union, transition started later, and only the 
dissolution of the Soviet Union in 1991 allowed a significant change in the policy. Even 
then, the first few years of transition in the former Soviet Union (FSU) countries were 
  5hampered by the challenges related to nation-building. Most FSU countries, with the 
notable exception of the three Baltic States, are still behind the CEECs in implementing 
reforms.  
As a result of this profound political and structural change, annual FDI flows in the 
region, of which a majority originated from EU, began to rise quickly from a low level. 
However, drastic economic and political reforms promoted in the CEECs at the 
beginning of the transition caused almost all members to suffer an economic recession to 
various degrees. Consequently, FDI inflows in the same period were adversely affected. 
Starting 1994, regional FDI picked up largely due to a successful transition in many of 
the CEECs. The almost doubled annual FDI inflows during this period from $12.3 billion 
in 1995 to $23.5 billion in 2000 were mainly induced by large-scale of privatization in 
the more advanced CEECs. For example, the purchase of a majority share in Poland’s 
Telekomunikacja Polska by France Telecom for $4 billion in 2000 was one of the largest 
privatization and FDI transactions in the region. The European Bank for Restructuring 
and Development (EBRD) compiles annually indicators depicting the progress in 
structural reforms related to the transition to market economy. EBRD (2007) shows the 
progress in both large-scale and small-scale privatization in our sample countries between 
1990 and 2004.  In Figure 3, we show the extent of privatization using an index, with a 
value of 4.0 denoting the level of reform comparable to a fully functioning market 
economy and a 1.0 being a completely unreformed economy. According to this Figure, 
we can see that many countries in the Central and Eastern Europe had completed the 
large-scale privatization by mid-1990s, while in a few countries the process was still 
  6incomplete in mid-2000s. However, it seems apparent that the countries which moved 
faster in privatization were also able to attract more FDI flows. 
With most privatization processes in the region’s advanced economies coming near 
a completion, the mode of FDI inflows in CEECs was expected to shift from privatization 
towards more technology-intensive greenfield projects and large cross-border mergers & 
acquisitions. In addition, this wave of FDI also encouraged less developed southeastern 
European countries to further their structural and institutional reform, accelerating the 
liberalization and privatization of state-owned enterprises, cutting corporate tax rates and 
introducing tax exemptions and other incentives to foreign investors. One thing to note is 
that behind this fast increment of FDI in the region, there still exists a high degree of 
variance in FDI distribution with disproportionately large shares flowing into more 
advanced states (Hungary, Czech Republic, Poland and Slovakia). Moreover, the sectoral 
distribution of FDI may differ between the CEECs and China, as well as between the 
CEECs themselves. For example, EBRD (1998) notes that already in 1997 some 40-60 
per cent of the FDI stock in the CEECs was in the manufacturing sector, but the 
importance of services was increasing rapidly, especially in the more advanced countries. 
During the last 15 years, the EU continued to increase its trade and FDI with China. 
In 1999, EU-originated FDI accounted for 11 percent of China’s total FDI absorption, 
making it the second largest source next to Hong Kong. Meanwhile, due to the 
geographical and cultural proximity between CEECs and the EU, the latter accounted for 
more than 79 percent of CEECs’ FDI inflows in the past 15 years. Thus, both China and 
CEECs consider the EU as their major sources of FDI inflows. The similarity between 
CEECs and China is also clear. They were both running a central planning economy 
  7under communism before the transition. Most of the foreign trade was accomplished 
within the socialist block. Starting as early as 1989, they began the transition from central 
planning to market economy. However, there is still much difference as to the exact 
trajectory they followed during the reform. While many CEECs adopted a comprehensive 
economic and political restructuring with precipitate privatization process, China was 
more prone to focusing on economic reforms alone. This discrepancy, together with other 
factors such as different host country’s comparative advantages contributes to the 
variation in FDI characteristics and trade pattern between the two regions. As pointed out 
in Sachwald (2004), when comparing FDI from US, Japan and the EU, they found that 
most US and Japanese multinational corporations (MNCs) are interested in taking China 
as the manufacturing platform via vertical channels while their European counterparts 
more favor a horizontal linkage in its domestic market. Surveys on international investors 
also indicate that, among the top decisive factors in determining FDI destination, 
relatively high skilled labor force in line with production needs in CEECs is the most 
attractive attribute that drives their investment to the region. 
Meanwhile, the fifth EU enlargement
2 with accession to the Central and Eastern 
European countries brings the opportunity for European investors to extend their 
operations in new member states. With access to a larger market and free movement of 
capital and labor resources across member states, foreign investors are more inclined to 
participate in local economy for reason of comparative advantages. Early literature has 
empirically testified the positive impact of increased integration in the European Union. 
Norman (1995) showed that the process of regional integration in the EU resulted in a 
                                                 
2 The European Union has undergone five enlargements with the largest occurring on May 1, 2004, when 8 out of 10 
new members are CEECs, including Czech Rep, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Slovakia and Slovenia. 
  8rapid growth in intra-EU FDI, contributing to the increase in intra-EU FDI from 25 
percent of total inward stock in 1980 to 40 percent in 1988. Parallel to those studies 
which focus on the benefits FDI brings to the host market, recent literature takes the other 
direction by tackling the possible crowding out effect of FDI as a result of the fifth EU 
enlargement. Particularly, they are worried that too much FDI redistribution from old 
members in the west to new ones in the east could mean a substitution for those 
traditional FDI destinations, thus hurting their economy. Barry and Hannan (2001) and 
Barry (2002) compare Ireland with new members among CEECs and conclude that the 
similarity between the two when joining the European Union (relatively low economic 
development level and cheap labor costs compared to other member states) can lead the 
latter to follow a similar development trajectory. In terms of FDI substitution, the authors 
propose two possible directions, both of which have found supporting evidence. On one 
hand, the fifth enlargement contributes to an increase in total FDI in both old and new 
member states. On the other hand, benefiting from technology spillovers and structural 
improvement due to FDI, CEECs are now in a better position competing with other old 
member states, causing a potential diversion of FDI flows. Indeed, similar patterns can be 
expected in other parts of the world as well. 
Given both China and CEECs’ enlarging shares of world FDI and the similarity as 
well as difference in their economic and institutional reform, one may wonder whether 
FDI inflows to the two regions have any correlation in between, and if so, is it of 
complementary or competitive nature? It is believed that a clear understanding of the 
exact relationship between the two is not only beneficial to both economists and 
politicians for research and policy making purpose, but also crucial in the understanding 
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amount of research that focuses on the comparison between China and the Central and 
Eastern Europe as favorable locations for global FDI. Empirical works that tend to 
quantify the magnitude of the potential impact between the two are even fewer. In this 
regard, our paper aims to provide an empirical analysis of the above issues. In particular, 
we want to show whether China’s continuing economic expansion, by appealing to 
foreign investors with the nation’s comparative advantage in labors costs and large 
market, diverts global FDI from CEECs, the so-called hollowing out effect. Alternatively 
China and CEECs may belong to distinctly different regional production networks and 
the correlation between their respective FDI inflows is zero. A third possibility is that 
both China and the CEECs both share a global supply network, leading to the possibility 
that FDI going to China and FDI going to the CEECs being complementary.  
 
3. Data and methodology 
Given the purpose of empirically investigating the correlation between China and 
Central and Eastern European countries in attracting foreign direct investment from the 
world, a model is constructed by regressing host country’s FDI inflows on the China 
effect variable, China FDI inflows in our model, while controlling for a set of host 
characteristics. Therefore, a statistically significant estimate on the China effect variable 
would be considered proof of a strong such correlation. The data used in the model are a 
panel spanning the period from 1990 to 2004 for 15 CEECs. They are Albania, Bosnia 
and Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Croatia, Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, 
Lithuania, Macedonia FYR, Poland, Romania, Serbia and Montenegro, Slovakia and 
  10Slovenia. Thus, the number of observations in the panel is 225 (15×15). We focus on the 
period starting in 1990 because we believe such selection fully covers the transition 
period and thus helps us gain a thorough understanding by incorporating the time trend 
and growth pattern of FDI inflows in the region. 
With all variables converted to log form except those presented in percentages
3, our 
benchmark regression appears as follows: 
 
t i i i t i t i t i t i t i t i
t i t t i t i t i t t i
v u ACCESS b TELE b PSR b INCTAX b TARIFF b OPEN b ILLIT b
WAGE b WFDI b GDP b GPCGR b FDI b CFDI b b FDI
, 13 , 12 , 11 , 10 , 9 , 8 , 7
, 6 5 , 4 , 3 1 , 2 1 0 ,
ln
ln ln ln ln ln ln
+ + + + + + + + +
+ + + + + + = −       (1) 
 
where subscript “i” and “t” stand for country i in year t and ui denotes the country-
specific effects and vit the disturbance term. 
Our dependent variable is annual foreign direct investment inflows to the 15 CEECs. 
As defined in IMF (1993), direct investment refers to “investment that is made to acquire 
a lasting interest in an enterprise in an economy other than that of the investor, with a 
purpose of having an effective voice on the management level.” Such management 
control usually requires a minimum of 10 percent ownership of investors for the 
investment to be classified as direct. Our data for FDI inflows are drawn from UNCTAD 
interactive database. 
The independent variables included in the model are expected to influence 
individual host country’s FDI inflows through both economic channel such as foreign 
trade and economic growth and environmental one with changes in institution and policy. 
One thing that interests us most is the use of China’s FDI inflows as a proxy for the 
  11China effect. According to Chantasasawat, Fung, Iizaka and Siu (2003), there are two 
lines of reasoning to support the inclusion of this variable. One major objective of foreign 
direct investment is to exploit comparative advantage in a host country. In deciding 
which destination to invest, Multinational Corporations (MNCs) often choose among 
several comparable candidates the one with the lowest labor costs. Under this scenario, 
an increase in FDI inflows to the country with lower labor costs must come at the 
expense of reducing the inflows to others, thus generating a “hollowing out” effect. It is 
not unusual nowadays to hear worries from various sources that the emergence of China 
as a top FDI recipient diverts the FDI inflows to other countries. Although it is a major 
concern, an equally strong and empirically sound argument suggests that rapid growth of 
FDI inflows to one country, via production network and supply chain linkages, can 
further stimulate similar growth in its neighboring and other economies. With further 
integration and cooperation across borders, an increasing portion of the production 
processes from MNCs now take form of specialization and fragmentation, which 
necessitate large investment within a set of production network. Member countries, with 
their respective advantages across distinct stages of production, all benefit from large 
inflows of foreign investment. Empirical studies in the literature give mixed implications 
on the correlation between country-wise FDI inflows. As pointed in Cravino, et al (2006), 
the emergence of China in the global economy has had positive effects on global FDI 
flows. Lall and Zhou (2005) suggest that China raised rather than diverted FDI flows to 
its neighboring countries. Eichengreen and Tong (2005) find that growth in China’s FDI 
inflows encourages FDI to other Asian countries but diverts those from OECD recipients. 
                                                                                                                                                 
3 See detailed data description in Appendix. 
  12In our case, the above two types of effect would imply opposite signs on the proxy 
variable and it remains to be seen which effect stands dominant. 
As mentioned earlier, we can think of this issue by considering three alternative 
hypotheses: China (together with East Asia) and CEECs being in their respective regional 
production network, so the estimated coefficient on the China effect is expected to be 
zero. A second hypothesis is that China and CEECs are in the same global supply chain, 
we then expect the coefficient on the China variable to be positive.  Lastly, China and 
CEECs can be perceived to be rivals by global multinationals, so the sign on the China 
effect should be negative. 
 Our model also controls for a potential agglomeration effect of FDI in transition 
economies. Various empirical works (Head, Ries and Swenson, 1995) show the existence 
of an agglomeration effect in most FDI activities. Such effect takes place when investors 
believe they can benefit from herding within the same location. To them, these benefits 
include but are not limited to a better supplier network, sufficient skilled labor and 
enhanced productivity, all of which are crucial for profitable long-term investment. 
Moreover, accumulation of FDI from investment herding may exert a positive feedback 
on the superiority of the local investment environment to potential investors of interest 
and thus lead to more FDI inflows. We use a one-year lagged value of FDI inflows to 
accommodate the agglomeration effect. 
Meanwhile, the host country’s macroeconomic conditions are among the top 
considerations in MNC’s location decision. Countries with stable economic growth and 
above average market size are more likely to have production capacity and large demand 
and are therefore favored as attractive destination. We consider host country’s per capita 
  13real GDP growth and annual real GDP good indicators of its economic growth and 
market size. Data for real GDP and per capita GDP are drawn from World Bank’s World 
Development Indicators. Real GDP data are measured in constant 2000 US dollars. 
It is well substantiated that country-specific institutional and policy factors are 
important to MNC’s investment location preference. Easy access to market, favorable 
investment regulations as well as domestic political stability are all among the top factors 
controlling the direction of their investment flow. However, to correctly interpret the 
findings on the relevant determinants of FDI, one should bear in mind the distinction 
between two types of FDI identified by their respective motivations. Market-seeking or 
horizontal FDI, with a focus on the market in host country, chooses local production to 
avoid the associated costs of trade. It is the type that dominated the FDI flows in the early 
days and still plays important role in today’s global economy. Apart from that is the so 
called cost-minimizing or vertical FDI where investors pick up different locations for 
each link of production chain to reduce the overall costs. Hanson, Mataloni and Slaughter 
(2001) indicate that recent surge of FDI inflows, especially to the South, is mainly of 
vertical form. Similar conclusion is also found in Markusen and Maskus (1999). 
Distinction on the type of FDI will have different implications on its location 
determinants, e.g. market size, trade restrictions. In our analysis, trade restrictions are 
controlled for by including both import tariff rates and openness to trade. Import tariff 
rates are collected from IMF Government Finance Statistic Yearbook as well as national 
statistical agency websites and are measured as percentage of import tariff on total 
revenue from international trade and transactions. And openness to trade is calculated as 
the ratio of country’s trade turnover to its GDP. 
  14In line with the distinction, labor costs, which are considered another important 
determinant of investment flows, may exert different impacts as well. It is argued that 
vertical FDI, by taking advantage of comparatively low production costs in the host 
country, shall be negatively related to it. In Bedi and Cieslik (2002), evidence shows a 
strong negative correlation between FDI and wage levels in Poland. In case of horizontal 
FDI, generally a negative sign would be expected as well because cost considerations, 
although they may no longer be the top priority in investors’ decision making, still play a 
role. However, this does not exclude the possibility that a positive relationship would 
show up in some instances. One would expect a positive sign on the wage rate to reflect 
the purchasing power and labor quality of the local market. To control for this factor, we 
use the wage rate in manufacturing as a proxy. The International Labor Organization’s 
LABORSTA provides the data for individual country manufacturing wages in local 
currency. We convert the wage rates to US dollars using official average exchange rates 
drawn from World Development Indicators. As for labor quality, we include the illiteracy 
rate among the host population as the proxy. The illiteracy rate data are from United 
Nations Education, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO)’s Institute for 
Statistics and are calculated as the percentage of people aged 15 and above who are 
illiterate. 
In terms of institutional variables, it is widely accepted that the host country’s 
political as well as financial risks are critical to its overall economic well-being. This is 
more so in our case because almost all CEECs have experienced political instability and 
economic slump at the beginning of the transition. As pointed out in Navaretti and 
Venables (2004), “political risk and instability seems to be an important deterrent to 
  15inward FDI”. Henisz (2000) demonstrates that political and contractual hazards may go 
hand in hand since transactions that originally should have been effectively organized 
through contractual agreements are more likely to appeal to arbitration or courts. Equally 
detrimental to inward FDI growth are the financial instability, corruption and social 
disorder of the host country. Corruption is believed to induce uncertainty in the business 
environment and discourages FDI inflows. Lack of legality indicates weak protection in 
case of need and therefore further aggravates the investment environment. We adopt the 
International Country Risk Guide (ICRG) group index of political stability risk (PSR) as 
a proxy for the institutional and political quality of the host country. The index 
incorporates 12 risk categories (bureaucratic quality, corruption, democratic 
accountability, ethnic tensions, external conflict, governmental stability, internal conflict, 
investment profile, law and order, military in politics, religious tension, and 
socioeconomic conditions) and is calculated as a weighted sum out of 100 (a higher score 
corresponds to less risk and stronger stability). 
Tax burden is another factor that concerns potential foreign investors when choosing 
a location for FDI. As one would expect, a high income tax rate for business could imply 
a narrower profit margin, which may deter FDI. It is supported in Wei (2000) that a 
significant negative relationship exists between the corporate income tax rate and FDI 
attraction. Also argued in the literature is the host country’s infrastructure quality. 
According to the survey from World Investment Directory (2003), large FDI projects are 
partially driven by the infrastructural quality of the host economy. World Economic 
Forum’s Chief Economist, Augusto Lopez-Claros (2005), has stated “an inadequate 
supply of infrastructure is rated by business as the biggest obstacle to operation in foreign 
  16affiliates and improving basic infrastructure would drive up FDI”. Fung, Iizaka and 
Parker (2002) and Fung, Iizaka and Siu (2003) find positive evidence that Chinese 
provinces with better infrastructure are more likely to become an FDI destination. Our 
data for the corporate income tax rate are collected from various issues of Price 
Waterhouse Cooper’s Worldwide Tax Summaries and European Tax Handbook. The 
proxy for the host country’s infrastructure quality is the number of telephone mainlines 
per thousand people collected from World Development Indicators. 
Factors that control for every host country’s FDI recipients include the current 
global supply characterized by world FDI outflows. Other things equal, a jump in FDI 
outflows worldwide is expected to have a positive effect on FDI inflows to all host 
countries. Therefore, annual world FDI outflow is added in our analysis to take care of 
this supply side effect. Data for world FDI outflows are drawn from the UNTCAD 
interactive database. (See summary table of data descriptions and sources in Appendix.) 
In addition, the fifth EU enlargement, by granting accession to eight CEECs, is 
likely to signal to foreign investors the credibility of these countries’ institutional and 
economic reforms. In recognition of their strong improvement, foreign investors are more 
confident choosing to operate their business in these economies. Follow the reasoning, a 
dummy, accession is constructed which assumes the value of 1 for all eight CEECs that 
are member states and 0 for the remaining seven. Since the dummy, accession is time 
invariant, estimation from either the fixed-effect model or first-differencing in the 
Generalized Method of Moments (GMM) will drop it out of the regression. In order to 
recover the estimates for accession, we transform by interacting it with a time trend
4. 
                                                 
4 The accession dummy is assigned as country-specific and time fixed across the period. 
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One common issue that arises in the estimation of panel data is whether the individual 
effects are considered as “fixed” or “random”. For comparison, we estimate and report 
both fixed and random effects with Generalized Least Squares method. Another problem 
with our analysis is the potential endogeneity of the lagged value of FDI inflows and the 
proxy variable for the China effect, China FDI inflows. One can argue that neither 
variable are strictly exogenous to the dependent variable, FDI inflows to CEECs. Some 
omitted factors can simultaneously affect both variables, making them endogenous and 
correlated with the error term (e.g. a worldwide technology shock that increases FDI to 
China is expected to enhance FDI to CEECs likewise; Eichengreen and Tong (2005) 
suggest that an improvement in investor sentiment worldwide can be another example of 
this endogeneity). A solution to this is the use of instrumental variables. In our analysis 
we adopt the Error Component Two Stage Least Squares (EC2SLS) model of Baitagi 
(1981, 2001), which is the IV analog of a random-effects model. In the first stage of 
EC2SLS, the endogenous variable is regressed on all of the exogenous variables in the 
system, which are modified by the “within” transformation and the “between” 
transformation, plus any exogenous instruments that we use. In the second stage, 
outcome variable is regressed on the exogenous variables and the predicted value from 
first stage in place of the endogenous variable. 
Meanwhile, in the context of the endogeneity problem, another estimation method, 
namely the Generalized Method of Moments (GMM) Instrumental Variable estimator for 
dynamic panels proposed by Arellano and Bond (1991), can yield consistent estimates 
  18while gaining significant efficiency
5 and therefore is also applied to our model. 
According to the method, the model to be estimated is as follows: 
 
it it t i it u X Y Y Δ + Δ + Δ = Δ − β α 1 ,                                   (2) 
 
where all “ ”s are the first-differenced term of the corresponding variables in equation 
(1), e.g.   is the first difference of the dependent variable, FDI inflows to 
country i in year t.   is the one-year lagged value of the new dependent variable, 
.   is a vector which includes all the explanatory variables from equation (1). 
Δ
it Y 1 , − − = Δ t i it Y Y
1 , − Δ t i Y
it X it Y Δ Δ
The model can be estimated in one stage or in two stages GMM. The two-stage 
method involves using the residuals from first stage to compute an optimal weighting 
matrix, which is subsequently applied to the second stage. In the following, we present 
only the one-stage estimates, from which robust standard errors can be constructed. In 
addition, Arellano and Bond (1991) warn against interpretation on coefficients within the 
two-stage framework, due to a likely underestimation of the standard errors of the 
coefficients. In fact, we estimated with both methods and the two-stage results were not 
qualitatively different. To check for the robustness of the model, we also conducted two 
specification tests. The first is the Arellano and Bond test of second-order correlation in 
the first-differenced error terms, the SOC test. The second is the Sargan test of over-
identification which tests for correlation between the instruments that are excluded from 
                                                 
5 The efficiency can be improved by using lagged values of both the instrumented variables and the instruments as 
additional instruments. For detailed GMM estimation, see Arellano and Bond (1991), Arellano and Bover (1995), and 
Blundell and Bond (1998). 
  19the second-stage model and the residuals. Both tests are used to check the validity of the 
lagged instruments as well as the appropriateness of the model. 
 
4. Empirical results 
Tables 2 to 5 present the parameter estimates for determinants of CEECs’ FDI 
inflows using different models: Feasible Generalized Least Squares with fixed effects 
(FGLS-FE) in Table 2, Feasible Generalized Least Squares with random effects (FGLS-
RE) in Table 3
6, Error Correction Two Stage Least Squares (EC2SLS) and Generalized 
Method of Moments (GMM) in Tables 4 and 5. Column I through VI in each table 
compares the results for various specifications. 
Our results show a positive coefficient on China FDI inflows among all models 
except those in GMM which keeps negative but insignificant. The coefficient is strongly 
significant and positive within the fixed-effect framework. This implies that FDI inflows 
to China and the Central and Eastern European countries are not, as certain scholars and 
politicians may have worried, strongly competing against each other. Rather, as indicated 
by the mostly positive estimates, they may even at some point work as 
complementarities. Consequently, a strong growth in China’s inward FDI should not be 
taken as a menace to CEECs by crowding out the FDI inflows to the region. However, 
the loose relationship between the two streams of FDI may come as the result of a 
relatively long distance between the two regions. As indicated in trade theory, geographic 
distance between two parties weakens bilateral trade as trade costs and other barriers tend 
to rise. It is possibly true that both geographic distance and cultural difference between 
                                                 
6 The Hausman test indicates the superiority of the Fixed-effect over Random-effect model though both results are 
presented. 
  20China and CEECs contribute to their unique attributes as host for FDI and therefore 
foreign investors in general do not necessarily consider the two markets as competitors. 
Another possible explanation for the loose connection lies in the different types of 
FDI that dominate the two markets. On one hand, as documented in various studies 
(Navaretti and Venables, 2004), a horizontal type FDI with the main purpose of market-
seeking is believed to be prevalent among the transition economies. On the other hand, 
due to its relative low cost of labor, China is believed to have an ever growing presence 
of vertical FDI, whose main purpose is to minimize the global production costs across all 
stages. Their focus on different goals led foreign investors to choose each market 
accordingly without necessarily placing one as a substitute for the other. 
Across all specifications, lagged FDI is strongly significant and positive, indicating 
a well-founded self-reinforcing effect of the dependent variable’s past value on its current 
value. Since FDI is considered a long-term capital investment that is irreversible in a 
short run, foreign investors are more cautious to their location choice. When host market 
successfully obtained numbers of large establishment from foreign investors, this is 
usually considered by potential investors as the signal of a sound investment 
environment. To them, such establishment could also be associated with a number of 
positive externalities in the host country such as technology spillovers, advanced labor 
skills and efficient production and supplier network and thus lead to further FDI inflows 
through a positive feedback channel. In line with recent empirical findings in support of 
the agglomeration effect in the U.S. (Wheeler and Mody, 1992) and Japanese FDI (Head, 
Ries, and Swenson 1995), this study indicates that the same effect also exists in transition 
economies. And this partly explains why the relatively advanced economies in the region, 
  21which began FDI absorption much earlier than the others, continue to attract much larger 
share of FDI flows to the region. 
Other variables mostly have the expected signs. With country size proxied by GDP 
level, its coefficient is consistently positive and strongly significant at the 1% level across 
all models. As the literature suggests that horizontal FDI are more attracted to host 
country with large market size, our result seems to be consistent with the early finding of 
dominant horizontal FDI among CEECs. The variable WFDI, which uses world FDI 
outflows to capture the supply-side effect on CEECs’ FDI inflows, carries a positive sign 
and is significant among various specifications. It is in our belief that the inclusion of this 
global supply control factor avoids a possible upward bias in the estimation of the China 
effect. 
Our results show that openness to trade is mainly positive and strongly correlated 
with FDI inflows. Since the variable is known as an indicator of a liberal trade 
environment in host country, its positive estimate implies that fewer regulatory 
restrictions and trade barriers tend to facilitate international trade and further induce FDI 
flows. One thing to note is that, although our results support a significantly positive 
correlation, the coefficient is only of limited absolute magnitude with some estimates 
turning even negative. In fact, in empirical literature on FDI, a negative impact of 
openness to trade on FDI has also been observed in various studies. One possible 
explanation, as pointed in Hausmann and Fernandez (2000), goes that openness to trade 
correlates with the degree of sophistication of the host financial system which in turn 
might be negatively correlated with FDI. The small absolute magnitude of the coefficient 
may come as a result of that. 
  22Manufacturing wage rate, a proxy for labor costs, carries a negative but mostly 
insignificant sign. A strong negative coefficient on wage rates would imply a dominance 
of vertical FDI in host market. However, as suggested from previous analysis, FDI in 
CEECs are predominantly of horizontal type with a focus of market penetrating. As a 
result, labor costs are more likely to be downplayed by foreign investors who are mainly 
interested in accessing larger market and seeking efficiency. To them, labor quality in the 
host market, a critical factor of operational productivity and efficiency, is of much higher 
relevance. In line with the reasoning, our labor quality variable as proxied by illiteracy 
rate is found to be negative and significant. Thus, low level of skilled labor as indicated 
by a higher illiteracy rate tends to deter FDI inflows, reflecting the importance of labor 
quality in determining CEECs FDI inflows. 
In the literature, tariffs are often considered an integral part of trade costs which are 
found to have a significant impact on FDI flows. However, on an aggregate level, their 
sign becomes ambiguous due to the different effect a horizontal or vertical FDI would 
bring. Specifically, they tend to attract horizontal FDI for domestic market penetrating 
purpose, but repel vertical FDI due to cost concerns. Thus, the sign would depend on 
which kind of FDI is dominant in the particular host country. Our results show a 
consistently positive though insignificant estimate, thus once again suggesting a 
dominant horizontal FDI among transition economies. Tax burden which is proxied by 
our inclusion of corporate income tax rate, even though keeping the right sign, seems to 
have only a marginal effect on FDI. One possible explanation, according to OECD study 
(2003), is that tax incentives may in certain cases be inefficient in promoting FDI. As 
they found out in their report, large MNCs usually are becoming more adept at relieving 
  23their own tax burden through sophisticated tax planning well before the operation. As a 
result, those tax incentives offered by the host country often lose their appeal and are 
ignored. In the extreme, it may even run counterproductive as these tax policies are 
considered to be nontransparent, insecure or bureaucratically infeasible. 
There is evidence that political and institutional stability of the host country can 
boost foreign investors’ confidence in their investment. Our proxy of ICRG political 
stability risk index carries a positive sign across all models and is strongly significant 
under the fixed-effect model. This finding is consistent with the literature as the index 
assigns a higher score to those countries with political and financial stability, efficient 
institutional structure and strong law enforcement, all of which are conducive to FDI 
attraction. 
Main telephone lines per thousand people as a proxy of host country’s infrastructure 
quality, is statistically insignificant and seems to carry the wrong sign. A possible reason 
lies in the fading importance of traditional communication technique in face of current 
innovations. Our positive coefficient on the accession dummy indicates that the fifth EU 
enlargement does help new members in the region to attract more FDI. Admission of 
CEECs to the EU can be considered a worldwide recognition of the country’s success in 
its political and economic reforms. As a result, foreign investors feel more comfortable 
investing in those markets with a favorable investment environment. 
In general, we find in this paper no crowding out effect of China’s FDI to the 
Central and Eastern European countries. In some cases, China’s FDI seems even to help 
induce more FDI inflows to the region. Our results also show that among the 
  24determinants, host country’s market size, trade environment, as well as the labor quality 
all have strong influence on FDI inflows to CEECs. 
 
5. Robustness checks 
The GMM estimation procedure aims to correct for the potential endogeneity 
problem. To ensure the appropriateness of our model under GMM, we need to verify that 
there is no second-order serial correlation of first-differenced error terms and the 
instrument sets used in the estimation are properly specified. For this purpose, two tests 
are performed, namely, the Allerano & Bond second-order correlation (SOC) test and the 
Sargan test. The p-value from Table 5 for both SOC test (null of no correlation) and 
Sargan test (null of no instrument misspecification) indicate that neither of the null 
hypotheses can be rejected. Thus, the results confirm the properness of our interpretation 
under the GMM framework. 
To further test the robustness of our model, we try to re-estimate by dropping 
individual country from our sample once at a time. It turns out that major conclusion 
remains effective. China FDI is not growing at the expanse of limiting potential FDI 
inflows to the Central and Eastern Europe. Market size, trade liberalization degree as well 
as labor quality remain significant in guiding FDI location decision among CEECs. In 
order to take a closer look at the impact of host country’s political and institutional 
environment, we replace the ICRG index PSR with three separate indicators, namely, 
Corruption, Law and order, and Government stability. A higher score in each category 
corresponds to an above average quality of host market in that respect. Again, the results 
  25are similar to the previous estimates with positive signs on each individual category. And 
our results for the China effect remain unchanged. 
Additionally, in an attempt to control for the possible contagious effect of the 
financial crises in Asia in 1997 and later in Russia in 1998 on CEECs, we add a dummy 
variable, crisis, into the model with 1 for both year 1997 and 1998 and 0 otherwise. The 
result looks compelling. With a significant and negative coefficient, it suggests that the 
two consecutive financial crises, by severely hurting the global banking system and 
capital markets, lessened foreign investors’ willingness and capability to invest in 




China’s emergence as a top recipient of FDI in the world follows its implementation 
of its open door policy and market economy reform over the last three decades. The 
successful transition experience of many Central and Eastern European countries also 
enables them to attract an increasing share of foreign investment from the world, 
particularly from the European Union. At the same time, results from existing studies 
strongly suggest that FDI going to emerging economies often serves to facilitate the 
operation of production networks. Given these different but related global trends, what is 
the relationship between FDI going to China and FDI going to CEECs?  We hypothesize 
that there can be three possible relationships: China and CEECs are in different distinct 
regional production network, implying that the impact of China on FDI going to CEECs 
being zero; alternatively, China and CEECs are jointly in a global supply chain so that 
  26FDI going to China and that going to CEECs are positively related; lastly, MNCs may 
view China and CEECs as being rival production sites so that the China effect on FDI 
going to CEECs is negative.  
Despite the significant academic and policy implications, the question we pose here 
remains unresolved due to a lack of related empirical work. In this paper, we employ a 
panel data to study the so called China effect in detail. Specifically, we compare the 
empirical estimates on 15 Central and Eastern European countries over a 15-year period 
from 1990-2004 with four different econometric approaches: FGLS with Random effects, 
FGLS with fixed effects, EC2SLS, and GMM. The central empirical results we discover 
is that generally the China effect variable is insignificant.  When the variable is 
significant, the sign of the coefficient is positive. The result supports the general 
conclusion that there is only a weak relationship between FDI going to China and FDI 
going to CEECs.  With some regressions, FDI going to China and FDI going to CEECs 
are positively and significantly related. In other words, much of our empirical work 
supports the idea that China and the CEECs are in distinct regional production networks, 
with some limited evidence showing that China and CEECs may be in a global supply 
chain.   
It can be argued that with certain Central and Eastern European countries 
maintaining a relatively high-skilled labor force and China one of the world’s largest 
markets with relatively low cost labor, large MNCs may choose to fragment their 
production processes into both locations in order to better accommodate the local demand 
and their increasingly sophisticated global supply chains. To this extent, our results might 
be considered another support for the claim that China and the Central and Eastern 
  27European countries, by undergoing the market economy transition through different 
approaches, are becoming integral to the global production network. It can also be 
mentioned that FDI into the CEECs has been more dominated by service sector 
investments than FDI into China, which is of course another indication of the different 
strategies chosen by the MNCs in these markets. Meanwhile, our analysis confirms the 
predominance of the host country‘s characteristics such as market size, degree of trade 
liberalization and labor quality as well as a global-wise healthy capital market in 
promoting FDI flows. We think that these findings provide some helpful policy 
implications to the Central and Eastern European countries on becoming attractive FDI 
destinations.  However, much more research needs to be done on this issue in the future. 
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    Figure 1: FDI inflows and FDI stock in China, 1980-2005 
 


















































































Source: UNCTAD World Investment Report online database. 
 
 
  29Figure 2: Distribution of China FDI stock by industry and country of origin, 1990-2004 
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Source: National Bureau of Statistics of China, 2005. 
  30Figure 3: EBRD indicator of progress in large-scale privatization 
 
 











































  31Figure 4: FDI inflows/stock to China and 15 CEECs as a percent of world’s total, 1990-2005 
 
 
























































Source: UNCTAD World Investment Report online database and authors’ own 
calculation. 
  32Table 1: Summary Statistics 
 
Variable Obs  Mean  Std.  Dev. Min  Max 
FDI†  202 1130  1850  0.01  12600 
CFDI†  225 34900  16000  3490  54900 
GPCGR 211  2.346  9.967  -31.34  86.35 
GDP†  218 27100  37000  1120  192000 
WFDI†  225  537000 319000 188000 1240000 
WAGE 161  295.833  206.572  32.72  1174.9 
INCTAX 126  29.892  8.219  5  45 
TARIFF 139  4.141  3.781  0  18.57 
OPEN 211  96.803 32.765 34.82  180.36 
ILLIT 170  2.711  4.905  0.2  23.04 
PSR 155  70.229  10.713  26  87 
TELE 220  238.424  99.738  12.16 424.91 





  33Table 2: Dependent variable: Inflow FDI (Fixed-effect) 
 





































































































































Obs.  157  132  101  62 99 61 
R-squared  0.707 0.792 0.807 0.802 0.803 0.794 
 
Notes: 
(1). Standard errors are reported in parentheses. ***, ** and * indicate coefficient 
significant at 1, 5 and 10%, respectively. 
 
  34Table 3: Dependent variable: Inflow FDI (Random-effect) 
 





































































































































Obs.  157  132  101  62 99 61 
R-squared  0.672 0.669 0.625 0.587 0.619 0.583 
 
Notes: 
(1). Standard errors are reported in parentheses. ***, ** and * indicate coefficient 
significant at 1, 5 and 10%, respectively. 
 
  35Table 4: Dependent variable: Inflow FDI (EC2SLS) 
 





































































































































Obs.  147  123  93 59 93 59 
R-squared  0.706 0.782 0.804 0.806 0.806 0.806 
 
Notes: 
(1). Standard errors are reported in parentheses. ***, ** and * indicate coefficient 
significant at 1, 5 and 10%, respectively. 
 
  36Table 5: Dependent variable: Inflow FDI (GMM) 
 





































































































































Obs.  157  132  101  62 99 61 
Sargan 
test 
0.040 0.483 0.480 0.473 0.480 0.473 
SOC  test  0.472 0.387 0.660 0.097 0.541 0.095 
 
Notes: 
(1). Standard errors are reported in parentheses. ***, ** and * indicate coefficient 
significant at 1, 5 and 10%, respectively. 
(2). Sargan test (p-value): null hypothesis is no misspecification with instrument sets. 
(3). SOC test (p-value): null hypothesis of no second-order correlation in differenced 
errors.  
  37Appendix: Data Descriptions and Sources  
 
Variable Definition  Source 
FDI†  FDI inflows (constant 2000 USD in 
million) 
UNCTAD World Investment 
Report online database 
CFDI†  China FDI inflows (constant 2000 
USD in million) 
UNCTAD World Investment 
Report online database 
FDIt-1
†  One year lagged FDI inflows UNCTAD  World  Investment 
Report online database 
GPCGR  Growth rate of real GDP per capita 
(%) 
World Development Indicator 
online database 
GDP†  Annual real GDP (USD in million)   World Development Indicator 
online database 
WFDI†  World FDI outflows (constant 2000 
USD in million) 
UNCTAD World Investment 
Report online database 
WAGE†  Wage rate in manufacturing sector 
in US$, converted by official 
average exchange rates from local 
currencies 
self calculation with 
International Labor 
Organization’s LABORSTA 
and WDI data 
INCTAX  Corporate income tax rate (%)  PWC Worldwide Tax 
Summaries and European Tax 
Handbook 
TARIFF  Taxes on international trade (% of 
total revenue) 
IMF Government Finance 
Statistics Yearbook and various 
national statistic agencies 
OPEN  Ratio of country’s trade turnover to 
its GDP (%) 
self calculation with WDI data 
ILLIT  Percentage of people aged 15 and 
above who are illiterate (%) 
UNESCO Institute for 
Statistics 
PSR  Political stability risk index  ICRG Group 
TELE†  Number of telephone mainlines per 
1000 people 
World Development Indicator 
online database 
†: variables transformed into logs. 
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